Key Takeaways
- The Gap: Haig was a cavalry officer commanding an army of artillery, tanks, and aircraft. He never fully understood the technologies that won his war.
- The Oscillation: Haig swung between excessive enthusiasm for new weapons and unrealistic expectations of what they could do.
- The Delegation: Middle managers (corps commanders) drove real innovation while Haig focused on strategy and politics.
- The Eventual Adaptation: By 1918, Haig had learned to trust his technical subordinates—and victory followed.
- The Lesson: Leaders don't need to understand technology in detail. They need to know what they don't know.
The Cavalry Officer’s War
Douglas Haig was born to command cavalry. He trained for it, excelled at it, and believed in it. When he became Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force in December 1915, he was the finest cavalry officer Britain had produced in a generation.
Unfortunately, cavalry was about to become irrelevant.
Year Haig was born
Before the internal combustion engine existed
The war Haig inherited was fought with:
- Artillery that could destroy anything above ground
- Machine guns that made cavalry charges suicidal
- Aircraft for reconnaissance and ground attack
- Tanks that could cross trenches and crush wire
- Chemical weapons that required new tactics and equipment
- Radio enabling real-time coordination
Haig understood horses. He had to command a machine army.
The Technology Gap
The gap between Haig’s experience and his responsibilities was vast:
Artillery: Modern gunnery required mathematics—barrel wear calculations, meteorological corrections, survey coordination. Haig was not a mathematician.
Tanks: The internal combustion engine was a mystery to Haig. He couldn’t evaluate claims about what tanks could or couldn’t do.
Aircraft: Aviation was barely a decade old. Its military applications were being invented in real-time. Haig had no framework for judging air power.
Communications: The telephone and radio were transforming command. Haig preferred written orders and personal visits—19th-century methods for a 20th-century war.
Major technologies Haig didn't understand
Tanks, aircraft, radio communications
This wasn’t unusual. Every senior commander in WWI faced the same gap. The war was more technologically advanced than any previous conflict. No one’s training prepared them for it.
But Haig’s gap was larger than most, because cavalry was the arm most transformed by new technology. An artillery officer might struggle with tanks. A cavalry officer struggled with everything.
The Pattern: Enthusiasm Without Understanding
Haig’s relationship with new technology followed a consistent pattern:
Stage 1: Initial Skepticism
When a new weapon appeared, Haig was dubious. Would it actually work? Was it just another fad?
Stage 2: Sudden Enthusiasm
Once the weapon showed promise, Haig became an advocate—often before the technology was ready.
Stage 3: Premature Deployment
Haig pushed to use the weapon before tactics were developed, crews were trained, or production was scaled.
Stage 4: Disappointment
The weapon failed to meet unrealistic expectations. Haig felt vindicated in his original skepticism.
Stage 5: Gradual Learning
Over time, realistic doctrines emerged. The weapon became effective. Haig took credit.
This cycle repeated with almost every new technology: tanks, aircraft, predicted artillery fire, smoke screens, and more.
The Haig technology adoption cycle
Repeated with each new weapon
Case Study: Tanks
The tank is the clearest example of Haig’s pattern.
September 1916: Tanks are first deployed at the Somme. Haig pushes for their use despite protests that they aren’t ready. Only 49 tanks are available. Most break down. The attack partially succeeds, but tanks contribute little.
Haig’s conclusion: Tanks have promise. Order more.
November 1917: Cambrai. Nearly 400 tanks attack without preliminary bombardment. Day 1 is spectacular—six-mile advance. But tanks break down, get stuck, or are destroyed. By Day 3, only 36 remain operational. The Germans counterattack and regain most lost ground.
Haig’s conclusion: Tanks can break through, but cavalry must exploit. (The cavalry couldn’t keep up.)
August 1918: Amiens. 400+ tanks attack as part of combined arms assault. Day 1 is even more spectacular—eight-mile advance. Tanks break down again, but infantry, artillery, and aircraft pick up the slack.
Haig’s conclusion: The system works.
Before Haig understood tank limitations
1916, 1917, 1918
The irony: tanks could have been used effectively from 1917. The technology wasn’t the limiting factor—understanding was.
The Cavalry Obsession
Haig’s most controversial decisions often involved cavalry.
Throughout the war, Haig kept cavalry divisions behind the front, waiting for the breakthrough that would let them exploit into open country. At the Somme. At Arras. At Passchendaele. At Cambrai.
The breakthrough never came—or when it did, cavalry couldn’t exploit it.
Cavalry horses maintained through 1917
For a breakthrough that never came
Critics argue Haig’s cavalry obsession wasted resources that could have built more tanks or trained more infantry.
Defenders argue cavalry was useful—for reconnaissance, pursuit, and the few occasions when mobility mattered.
The truth is probably that Haig believed in cavalry because he understood cavalry. It was the one arm he truly grasped. In a war of technologies he couldn’t comprehend, cavalry represented certainty.
The Subordinate Solution
How does an organization function when the leader doesn’t understand the core technology?
In the British Army of 1917-1918, the answer was: delegation to technically competent subordinates.
The Corps Commanders
Between GHQ (Haig’s headquarters) and the fighting divisions sat the corps—groups of 2-4 divisions under a Lieutenant General. Corps commanders became the crucial link:
Currie (Canadian Corps): Insisted on detailed planning, extensive rehearsal, and limited objectives. His corps became one of the most effective formations on the Western Front.
Monash (Australian Corps): An engineer by training, Monash understood combined arms instinctively. His corps executed some of the war’s most complex operations.
Rawlinson (Fourth Army): Developed the “bite and hold” tactics that made the Hundred Days possible.
Where real tactical innovation occurred
Not GHQ, not divisions—corps
These commanders understood what Haig didn’t. They developed the tactics, trained the troops, and executed the operations that won the war.
Haig’s role became strategic: allocating resources, managing allies, handling politics. The technical details he left to those who understood them.
The Tank Corps
The Tank Corps—eventually commanded by J.F.C. Fuller—developed tank doctrine from the ground up.
Fuller and his officers figured out:
- How many tanks could be sustained in an advance
- How tanks and infantry should cooperate
- What terrain tanks could and couldn’t cross
- When to commit reserves and when to wait
Haig received the results. He made strategic decisions about where and when to use tanks. But the technical decisions came from specialists.
The Modern Parallel
Haig’s dilemma is universal. Every leader eventually faces technology they don’t understand:
CEOs and AI: Today’s business leaders must make decisions about artificial intelligence without understanding how machine learning works.
Politicians and Cyber: Elected officials must fund cyber defense without grasping encryption, networks, or hacking.
Generals and Drones: Military commanders must integrate autonomous systems developed by engineers half their age.
The question isn’t whether leaders will face a technology gap. They will. The question is how they’ll handle it.
Of leaders who will face unfamiliar technology
The only question is how they respond
Lessons from Haig
What can modern leaders learn from Haig’s dilemma?
1. Know What You Don’t Know
Haig’s worst decisions came when he thought he understood tanks but didn’t. His best decisions came when he acknowledged ignorance and trusted specialists.
Premature deployment at the Somme: Haig thought tanks were ready. They weren’t.
Effective use at Amiens: Haig trusted his tank corps commanders to decide how tanks should be employed.
2. Beware the Enthusiasm Cycle
New technology generates excitement that often exceeds its initial capability. Haig fell for this with tanks, expecting breakthrough when only tactical advantage was possible.
The first deployment of any new technology will disappoint. Plan for it.
3. Trust but Verify Subordinates
Haig’s subordinates—Currie, Monash, Rawlinson—developed the tactics that won. Haig gave them latitude to experiment. But he also evaluated results and replaced commanders who failed.
Delegation isn’t abdication. Haig remained responsible for outcomes.
4. The Technology Will Eventually Work
Tanks were nearly useless in 1916. By 1918, they were a battle-winning system—not because the technology changed dramatically, but because doctrine caught up.
Patience matters. Technology that fails today may succeed tomorrow if you keep learning.
From useless tanks to battle-winning system
1916-1918
5. Your Instincts May Be Wrong
Haig’s instinct said cavalry would win the war. He was wrong. The leaders who succeed with unfamiliar technology are those who can override their instincts with evidence.
This is hard. Haig never fully managed it. But his partial adaptation was enough to win.
The Verdict on Haig
Was Haig a good commander?
The question has divided historians for a century. “Butcher Haig” vs. “The Man Who Won the War.”
The truth is probably more nuanced:
Haig was a poor tactician who never understood the technologies that dominated his war.
Haig was a competent strategist who managed coalitions, allocated resources, and maintained pressure until Germany broke.
Haig was an effective delegator who gave latitude to subordinates who understood what he didn’t.
Haig was a learner—slow, painful, but real. The Haig of 1918 was not the Haig of 1916.
The ultimate result
Despite the learning curve
His dilemma—commanding technology he didn’t understand—is every leader’s dilemma. His solution—trust specialists, evaluate outcomes, keep learning—remains the template.
The cavalry officer won a machine-age war. Not because he understood the machines, but because he eventually learned to trust those who did.
This post is part of the WWI Technology series, exploring how the Great War forced military institutions to adapt—or die.