
The Invisible Army - Part 5: The Wrong Size Railroad
The Invisible Army ← Series Home Key Takeaways Infrastructure is strategy: Russia's wider railroad gauge (1,520mm vs. Germany's 1,435mm) meant German trains couldn't use Russian tracks—forcing either gauge conversion or transshipment at the border. Conversion takes time armies don't have: German engineers could convert about 50km of track per day. The front advanced 50km per day in the first weeks. The railhead never caught up. Trucks can't compensate: Germany tried to bridge the gap with trucks, but vehicles consumed fuel faster than they could deliver it over Russian distances and roads. The tyranny of distance: At 500km from the border, the logistics math collapsed. The German army was literally starving as it approached Moscow. The Plan That Ignored Logistics Operation Barbarossa, launched on June 22, 1941, was the largest military operation in history. Three million German soldiers, organized into 150 divisions, invaded the Soviet Union along a 1,800-mile front. ...


