
Economics Envy - Part 6: The Spite Premium: Understanding the Wealthy-Harming Preference in Redistributive Policy
Economics Envy: The Dual Calculus of Human Motivation ← Series Home Key Takeaways Wealthy-Harming Preference: Desire to punish rich even if inefficient, yielding less aid for poor. Empirical Evidence: 14%-18% chose higher taxes delivering less aid across countries. The Predictor: Dispositional envy only reliable predictor for WHP. The Motive Split: Compassion predicts helping poor, envy predicts WHP. Policy Necessity: Separate altruistic goals from spiteful motives in tax design. The Dual Calculus of Envy Policy motivation frequently includes a destructive, punitive component. Support for government redistribution policies is complex, driven by multiple independent motivations. The Wealthy-Harming Preference (WHP) describes the desire to tax or punish the wealthy even when that action proves economically inefficient. This punitive desire stems from malicious motives. For individuals exhibiting WHP, the reduction of the better-off person’s welfare is the goal itself, not just a byproduct of increasing their own resources. Historically, non-altruistic individuals support redistribution because they value reduced consumption by the rich. ...




