The Invisible Army - Part 16: Moving Mountains

The Challenge

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Within days, Iraqi forces were positioned on the Saudi Arabian border, threatening the world’s largest oil reserves.

The United States decided to deploy forces to defend Saudi Arabia�and eventually liberate Kuwait. The operation would require:

• 500,000 troops and their equipment
• 7 million tons of supplies
• 100,000+ vehicles including tanks and aircraft
• Moved 8,000 miles from the United States
• To a region with limited infrastructure outside major cities
• In the most hostile climate American forces had ever faced

This was Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm�the largest military logistics operation since World War II.

The Logistician

The man who built the logistics machine was Lieutenant General William G. “Gus” Pagonis, a career logistics officer who would later write **“Moving Mountains”**�the definitive account of Desert Storm logistics.

Pagonis arrived in Saudi Arabia in August 1990 with a small team and a mandate: build a logistics infrastructure that could support 500,000 troops in combat.

He had six months. What he built would become the template for modern expeditionary logistics.

The Pagonis Philosophy

Pagonis brought principles that would prove essential:

Centralized control: One logistics commander with authority over the entire theater supply system. No competing fiefdoms, no jurisdictional gaps.

Decentralized execution: Subordinates empowered to solve problems without waiting for approval.

Visibility: Know where everything is. Track every shipment. Maintain awareness of the entire supply picture.

Redundancy: Multiple supply routes, multiple sources, backup systems for everything critical.

Building the Infrastructure

The Ports

Saudi Arabia had modern ports�a crucial advantage over the Falklands. But military logistics overwhelmed civilian capacity.

The ports used:

• Ad Dammam
• Jubail
• Other smaller facilities

The challenge: Unloading millions of tons of equipment onto ports designed for commercial traffic.

The solution:

• Military port operations teams
• Around-the-clock operations
• Massive parking areas for vehicles awaiting transport inland
• Containerized cargo systems for efficient handling

At peak, the ports unloaded 40,000 tons per day�more than the entire capacity of South Vietnam’s ports during the busiest year of that war.

The Depots

Inland from the ports, Pagonis built logistics bases that dwarfed anything in Military and Logistics:

Log Base Alpha, Bravo, Charlie: Massive supply installations holding everything from fuel to ammunition to food.

King Khalid Military City: An existing Saudi facility expanded into a major logistics hub.

Forward operating bases: Positioned to support the eventual offensive.

Each base was a city unto itself: fuel farms, ammunition supply points, maintenance facilities, hospitals, communication centers.

The Lines of Communication

Moving supplies from port to unit required transportation infrastructure.

Roads: Saudi Arabia had excellent highways�unlike Vietnam or the Falklands. The road network could support military traffic.

Heavy Equipment Transporters: Tanks and armored vehicles moved by truck rather than driving themselves (preserving tracks and engines for combat).

The fuel pipeline: Building on desert experience, logistics engineers constructed fuel pipelines into the forward areas, reducing truck transport requirements.

The Numbers

What Was Moved

The statistics of Desert Shield/Storm remain staggering:

The Rate of Movement

At peak, logistics operations were moving:

• 40,000 tons per day through ports
• 20,000 vehicles per week to forward areas
• 5 million gallons of fuel per day (VII Corps alone during ground offensive)

This throughput exceeded World War II norms by an order of magnitude.

The Left Hook

The defining operation of the ground war was the “Left Hook"�a corps-sized movement through the empty desert west of Kuwait to envelop Iraqi forces.

This maneuver would have been impossible without logistics preparation.

The Challenge

VII Corps�the heavy armored force that would execute the Left Hook�had to:

1. Move 300+ miles to a new assembly area (in secret)
2. Accumulate supplies for a multi-day offensive
3. Attack across trackless desert without established supply lines
4. Maintain tempo against a well-supplied enemy

The Solution

Pagonis built the logistics infrastructure to make it possible:

Forward Log Bases: Supply points pre-positioned along the attack route.

Fuel Farms: Millions of gallons of fuel cached in the desert.

Combat Service Support: Maintenance and medical units integrated into the advance.

Main Supply Routes: Roads designated, marked, and maintained across the desert.

The Execution

When the ground offensive began on February 24, 1991, VII Corps advanced at unprecedented speed:

• 300,000 soldiers in motion
• 40-50 miles per day advance rate
• Continuous resupply by truck, helicopter, and eventually captured Iraqi stocks

The Iraqis never had a chance. They were designed to fight a war of attrition along fortified lines. The Left Hook bypassed their defenses entirely.

And the Left Hook was only possible because Pagonis had spent six months building the logistics to support it.

Lessons of Desert Storm

Time Is Everything

The six-month buildup between August 1990 and February 1991 made the difference.

Compared to the Falklands’ 72-hour scramble, Desert Storm demonstrated what methodical preparation could achieve:

• Complete logistics infrastructure built before combat
• Supplies pre-positioned where they’d be needed
• Transportation networks established and tested
• Systems debugged before stress tested

This luxury of time may never recur. Future crises may not allow six months of preparation.

Host Nation Support

Saudi Arabia provided:

• Modern ports and airports
• Excellent road networks
• Fuel and water supplies
• Land for bases and installations
• Political support for the operation

Without this host nation support, Desert Storm would have been impossible�or at least far slower.

This raises questions about future operations where host nation support may be unavailable, inadequate, or actively opposed.

Technology Enabled Visibility

Desert Storm saw the first large-scale use of:

• Computer-based logistics tracking
• Satellite communication for supply coordination
• Automated identification (early versions)
• Rapid electronic ordering and requisition

These technologies, primitive by later standards, previewed the digital transformation of military logistics.

The Consumption Rate

Modern mechanized warfare consumes resources at rates that stunned even experienced logisticians:

• VII Corps burned 5 million gallons of fuel per day during the offensive
• A single Apache helicopter battalion required 20,000 gallons of fuel per day
• Ammunition consumption was measured in hundreds of tons per division per day

These consumption rates define what modern warfare requires�and what must be sustained for victory.

What Worked

The Logistics System

Pagonis built a system that:

• Never ran out: No unit went without essential supplies
• Stayed ahead: Supplies were in position before they were needed
• Adapted: Problems were solved without catastrophe
• Enabled operations: The Left Hook happened because logistics made it possible

This was vindication of professional logistics. The systems, training, and doctrine developed since Vietnam proved themselves.

The Command Structure

Centralized control under a single logistics commander eliminated the conflicts that plagued earlier wars:

• One person responsible
• One set of priorities
• One system of distribution

The model would be replicated in subsequent operations.

What Almost Failed

Sealift

Even with six months and massive resources, sealift was the limiting factor.

American sealift capacity had atrophied since Vietnam. Civilian ships were again requisitioned. The Ready Reserve Fleet (mothballed ships) was activated�many failed to start.

Had the war come sooner, equipment would not have arrived in time. Sealift remained a critical vulnerability.

Ammunition

Certain ammunition types ran short:

• Precision-guided munitions (a preview of future problems)
• Specific artillery rounds
• Some missile types

The 100-hour ground war ended before shortages became critical. A longer war might have revealed deeper problems.

The What-If

Desert Storm succeeded so completely that few asked: what if the Iraqis had attacked during the buildup?

In August-September 1990, American forces in Saudi Arabia were minimal. Iraqi forces could likely have swept to the oil fields before significant resistance formed.

The logistics buildup was conducted under the shield of Iraqi passivity. That shield cannot be assumed in future operations.

The Legacy

For American Military Doctrine

Desert Storm validated “decisive force"�overwhelming logistics supporting overwhelming combat power.

The lesson learned: when America has time to prepare, American logistics can support any operation.

The lesson not learned: what happens when time isn’t available?

For Future Expeditionary Operations

Desert Storm set expectations that shaped Iraq 2003, Afghanistan, and subsequent operations:

• Host nation support would be available
• Time for buildup would be available
• Sealift and airlift would be sufficient
• Consumption rates were manageable

Some of these expectations proved optimistic in later wars.