Arid Ambition - Part 3: The Gods of Concrete and the Pork Barrel

The promise of the American West, founded on water scarcity, found its ultimate expression in concrete and steel. Early 20th-century engineers did not merely manage water; they embarked on a massive, zealous effort to redirect natural forces. When archaeologists from another planet sift through our civilization’s remains, they might conclude that our temples were dams. These formidable structures, constructed with exquisite care, will likely outlast skyscrapers and cathedrals. The completion of Hoover Dam on the Colorado River was the first global signal of this new era. The dam, which rises 726 feet (221 m) tall, gave engineers the confidence to conquer nearly all the world’s great rivers.

The Welfare State in Cowboy Boots

The political support that enabled these monumental structures stemmed from a profound contradiction. The Reclamation Act of 1902 provided the framework for an unparalleled experiment in federal intervention. Although Western leaders extolled rugged individualism, they faced problems only the national government could master. The Reclamation Act quietly turned the American West into the first and most durable example of the modern welfare state. Projects relied on the Reclamation Fund, financed by federal land sales.

The law stipulated that revenues from water sales would repay the construction costs. Crucially, the law exempted farmers from paying interest on most of their repayment obligations. This interest exemption represented a massive subsidy, often amounting to 90 cents on the dollar of the project cost.

This massive public investment financially coddled farmers, many of whom were conservative politicians who routinely decried federal welfare programs.

The original spirit of the Reclamation Act aimed at creating many small holdings. The law initially decreed 160 acres (65 ha)—a quarter section—as the maximum ideal acreage for a small farmer. Commissioner Floyd Dominy stated the law was designed to pack as many families as possible into water-limited regions. For Dominy, the goal was subsistence, where many could make a living on just 40 irrigated acres (16 ha). However, this limitation was consistently circumvented through liberal interpretations. A common tactic permitted a man and wife to jointly irrigate 320 acres (129 ha). Even when the law’s incremental-land-value provisions were violated, legal consequences were negligible. In one Columbia Basin case involving widespread land speculation, the ensuing conviction resulted in a fine of only $850.

The Dominy Imperium: King of Reclamation

The second wave of dam building saw the Bureau of Reclamation (BoR) rise to unprecedented influence. This expansion was personified by Floyd Dominy, the commissioner who headed the agency through the 1960s. Dominy was characterized by manic energy and a singular focus on construction. Early in his career, he built three hundred dams in Campbell County, Wyoming, serving as a “one-man Bureau of Reclamation”. He believed building a dam, storing the water, and making the desert bloom amounted to changing the order of the universe.

Dominy perfected the art of political control over federal appropriations. He kept detailed lists of Bureau allies on Capitol Hill, categorizing them for reward. He would quickly yank money from projects in the districts of uncooperative Senators. These funds were then steered toward his political friends. This system created a profound loyalty to the Bureau among Western politicians.

Dominy’s arrogance grew with the Bureau’s power. He became famously confrontational with critics, including conservationists and even fellow politicians. When asked about dams ruining river habitat, Dominy once shouted, “You realize you’re asking me to go against every sound precept of water management for a bunch of goddamned birds and fish!”. He aggressively defended even the Bureau’s most dismal financial failures. Dominy famously argued that Congress was partly to blame for failure, since lawmakers demanded projects in areas where agriculture was not worth the cost of irrigation. He also exploited the frailty of his allies. Dominy personally wrote the questions and answers for the senile Senator Carl Hayden to use in Appropriations Committee hearings.

The Rivals in Crime

Dominy’s ambitions were constantly checked and inflated by the BoR’s intense, unholy rivalry with the Army Corps of Engineers. This competition often resulted in dozens of wasteful and redundant construction projects. The Corps focused on flood control and navigation, while the BoR prioritized irrigation and power. Their overlapping missions and conflicting priorities ensured that projects were built for political reasons rather than sound engineering or economic necessity.

A classic example was the development of the Missouri Basin. In response to massive flooding in 1943, the Corps rushed out the Pick Plan. The Bureau quickly countered with its own ambitious Sloan Plan. The two plans were so contradictory that critics said only one could logically be built. In 1944, President Roosevelt forced a truce, leading to the Pick-Sloan Plan. This “compromise” amounted to adopting nearly every dam and project from both the Bureau’s and the Corps’ original reports. Critics derided the outcome as a “shameless shotgun wedding,” costing the taxpayers at least $250 million in redundant features.

This rivalry allowed local interests to play the agencies against each other for the most favorable terms. In the case of Marysville Dam, California officials sought Corps construction to avoid the Bureau’s acreage limits on the water. A Bureau director warned Dominy that the Bowman-Haley dam, an awful Reclamation project with pitiable water yield, should be built only to stop the Corps from getting the money. He noted the Bureau had reported unfavorably on the project for thirty years.

The BoR financed many uneconomical irrigation ventures through the “cash register dam” system. These massive dams, like those in the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP), produced hydroelectric power. The resulting power revenues were used to subsidize the inevitable losses incurred by irrigation in the arid Upper Basin states. This system ensured that water, regardless of the exorbitant cost of moving it, would flow toward power and money.

The Triumph of the Pork Barrel

The Congressional mechanism perpetuated this massive spending despite overwhelming evidence of waste. Water projects were a form of political currency, allowing politicians to throw federal money into their home districts. Ideology became irrelevant in the face of the pork barrel. Barry Goldwater, a fierce conservative, was a dedicated supporter of the Central Arizona Project, despite its socialist nature. Alan Cranston, a leading liberal, successfully lobbied to legalize illegal sales of subsidized water to giant corporate farms.

The committee structure ensured project authorization. Leadership positions in the appropriations and public-works committees traditionally went to Western and Southern politicians. The 1980 Public Works Appropriations bill funded 288 individual projects. Of the eight projects receiving over $25 million, all but one were located in the South or West. This network efficiently rewarded supporters and punished opponents.

The financial justification for these projects was often absurd. President Jimmy Carter attempted to dismantle this system in 1977 by drafting a “hit list” of wasteful projects. One such dam offered only five cents in economic benefits for every taxpayer dollar invested. Carter was met with “icily hostile” Western reaction, damaging his presidency. Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado, an environmentalist, expressed outrage, stating, “We’re not going to be satisfied until we get our projects back”. The political pressure forced Carter into a full retreat, and his water policy reforms vanished.

For example, the Narrows Dam in Colorado was studied for decades, despite massive economic flaws. An updated 1982 study showed that for every dollar invested in the dam, only ten cents would be returned, resulting in a benefit-cost ratio of only .10 to 1.0. Yet, local political forces continued to champion the dam.

The political system, driven by a determination to conquer nature rather than live within limits, resulted in massive and persistent natural imbalance. This obsession created a civilization that relies on water flowing, quite literally, uphill toward power and money. The cost of conquering the desert proved less prohibitive than the political cost of admitting defeat.