The choice between fighter jets like the Gripen and F-35 reveals a state’s underlying theory of value in defense spending—whether it prioritizes sovereign public infrastructure or industrial policy and geopolitical signaling.
The F-35 program demonstrates how traditional cost-benefit analysis can be displaced by political-economic calculus, where excess capability is justified by inflated threats and sunk costs create unstoppable momentum.
Advanced weapons systems embed dependency layers that trade strategic flexibility for perceived security, creating forms of technological suzerainty and vendor lock-in.
Welfare analysis of defense programs shows that benefits are often privatized while costs and risks are socialized, leading to misallocation of public capital.
Sovereign alternatives like the Gripen preserve autonomy and option value, allowing nations to adapt to changing threats and alliances without hierarchical subordination.
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